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European economic integration creates unintended consequences for national public 
administrations. This paper offers a conceptual and empirical analysis of how these 
challenges are met. First, three challenges are identified: a reduced capacity to offer 
services to citizens who move freely; increasing administrative burdens; and negative 
externalities for all parts from a single states’ administrative failure. Second, a conceptual 
framework is developed that links each challenge to a most likely response in form of 
modes of administrative cooperation. Third, the framework is illustrated by an empirical 
analysis of the coordination of Social Security Systems, Labor Inspectorates and Posted 
Workers. The case studies show that horizontal administrative cooperation is developed 
step-wise over time and in line with the theoretical framework. In sum, we can sustain 
that horizontal administrative cooperation is a relevant additional integration dynamic 
that buffers unintended effects of market integration on formally independent but 
increasingly interdependent member state executive bodies.   
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The European Union’s (EU) economic integration process has merged national 
economies into a single market. Yet, independent public administrations of the member 
states remain the main carriers of the implementation and enforcement of EU rules. 
Despite the formal independence of national public administrations, in order to realize 
the core goals of the single market, administrative actors depend increasingly on the 
smooth interaction between administrative units beyond their nationally defined territory. 
Against this background, this article asks which practices assure the functioning of the 
single market when it comes to hands-on implementation by national administrators. To 
answer this question, we draw the attention to executing authorities and their cooperation 
in trans-border administrative processes by examining a key policy of the single market: 
worker mobility. In contrast to recent attempts to conceptualize administrative 
cooperation across levels in the EU system (Benz A. et al., 2016; Bauer M. W. & J. 
Trondal 2015), this article aims to grasp conceptually the emergence of specific forms of 
horizontal administrative cooperation as additional cooperation logic besides the mostly 
studied vertical linkages. 
The relevance of the research question derives from the inevitable new administrative 
challenges an integrated single market creates for national executive bodies. Empirically, 
we can observe that both negative and positive integration – i.e. liberalization and EU-
wide regulation – inescapably constrain state-defined public administrations. We can 
empirically identify three distinct, yet overlapping administrative challenges:  
• with trans-border free movement, national agencies designed to operate on a 
confined territory can no longer fulfill their control and public service tasks vis-
à-vis their constituency because, if citizens can claim services depending on their 
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place of work or residence and nationality, administrative processes span beyond 
the single state jurisdictions and can only be realized if different national offices 
cooperate. Short: stand-alone national public administrations lose part of their 
capacity to protect and offer services to member state citizens.  
• with free movement, agencies are faced with new administrative demands; the full 
application of transnational regulations (including rules of other member states 
under the country of origin and mutual recognition principles) and the 
management of trans-border processes implies an increase of administrative tasks. 
Short: public administrations are faced with additional administrative burdens.  
• with the dismantling of borders, the problem of interconnectedness and mutual 
dependencies between national administrations has increased. This implies also 
that inefficiencies of a single national public administration affect all other public 
administrations because it hampers the functioning of the common market. Short: 
the failure to participate in trans-border administrative processes or faulty 
application of EU-law by one state creates negative externalities for the system 
as a whole. 
In face of these “real-life” administrative challenges which the integration of the single 
market creates for national public administrations, we argue that an unintended effect of 
building the single market is the hollowing out of the national capacity to administer the 
market (Heidbreder E. G. 2014b).1 Even though the principle of independent national 
administrative authority still holds formally, de facto the internal market implies strong 
functional pressure for new administrative structures and practices in order to remedy the                                                         
1 Note that this line of argument echoes the argument that “the freedom of establishment is being 
used to hollow out the capacity of member states to shape the rules of corporate governance in their 
economies in accordance with national institutional traditions and political preferences” (Höpner, M. and 
Schäfer, A. 2007) . 
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above listed challenges. Concretely, our research interest thus deals with responses of 
bureaucratic actors developed in face of new pressures on public administrations, how 
these can be analytically structured and to which extent the different responses are 
applied. We hold that the observable responses depict relevant institutional answers to 
the constraining dissensus and that the emerging patterns hold wider implications for the 
course of European integration. 
To overcome policy coordination problems between 28 national administrations, the most 
encompassing response is actually to create a single integrated administration on the 
supranational level that would coordinate by hierarchy. This implies the vertical conferral 
of powers at the expense of national administrative autonomy. However, although 
tendencies of administrative centralization can be traced (Trondal J. 2010), often hand in 
hand with supranational actors pushing for competence extension, there is clearly no 
political support in the member states to subordinate their national administrations to a 
superior EU administration. Given that the harmonization of administrative systems is 
basically ruled out, we consciously draw the attention to less sovereignty-constraining 
responses, led by the assumption that the member states generally prefer solutions that 
imply the least sovereignty conferral to the EU level. This article therefore concentrates 
on more autonomy preserving responses as offered by horizontal administrative 
cooperation between national bodies. To be clear, this does not mean that vertical 
coordination is no longer of relevance or does not happen in parallel and even interlinked 
with horizontal coordination. However, for the purpose of this article we focus attention 
on coordination problems in which political preferences rule out strong vertical 
coordination and, so the argument, horizontal coordination is opted for as a less 
constraining alternative. Accordingly, the core of the article deals with the mechanisms 
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that foster administrative coordination as alternative to vertical integration. While vertical 
cooperation in the EU systems typically results from a political decision to allocate 
powers at the supranational level, horizontal cooperation is essentially the response of 
technocratic actors to coordination problems. Assuming national political preferences not 
to create a genuine EU administrative system, we argue that horizontal cooperation is the 
preferred second best solution, thus functionalism is the starting point of our theoretical 
argument. Being interested primarily in how particular horizontal cooperation forms are 
matched with varying coordination problems, we focus on the question how functional 
pressures are adequately dealt with by horizontal cooperation. Feeding into the dominant 
functionalist literature in public policy and public administration studies on cooperation 
(for a recent overview see Peters G. 2015) the article speaks to a well-established 
theoretical field. To avoid tautological explanations, responses to coordination problems 
are not understood to occur automatically. Instead, we consider bureaucratic actors to 
react strategically to functional pressure. Ultimately our argument claims, that 
administrative actors take decisions that shape EU integration by weighting costs and 
benefits of joint problem solution versus sustaining national sovereignty. This cost benefit 
analysis can – but does not need to – be influenced by strategic action of supranational 
actors. In line with this, starting from the above observation that interactions in the 
internal market create new administrative constraints, we put the spotlight on other 
coordination forms that stay below the threshold of formal authority conferral to the EU.  
Empirically, we analyze worker mobility, a field where the described administrative 
constraints have been a long-standing obstacle because of comprehensive legal and low 
level of administrative integration. In this field, we offer insights on how member state 
administrations adapt to and practically handle the effects entailed by the creation of the 
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single market. Crucially, this affects core state powers, namely the independent authority 
over public administrations, even though the harmonization of national bureaucracies is 
generally ruled out (Heidbreder E. G. 2015, Vifell Å. C. & Sjögren E. 2014). We draw 
on three case studies: the coordination of Social Security Systems, Labor Inspectorates 
and Posted Workers (Hartlapp M. et al. 2014, Hartlapp M. 2014). Applying a conceptual 
framework to the three cases, the theoretical contribution of the article is to identify 
systematic links between varying functional pressures and strategic actor responses. To 
this end, the next section presents a typology of administrative cooperation modes derived 
from the literature. The types of cooperation are then confronted with the specific 
administrative challenges identified above to construct systematic functional linkages 
resulting in expected responses. These theoretical linkages offer the analytical framework 
that is applied to the three case studies in order to, on the one hand, illustrate the 
application of the different but empirically strongly interrelated response modes and, on 
the other hand, to examine to which extent more functional pressure indeed leads to more 
sovereignty-constraining forms of cooperation. The article closes with a discussion of the 
empirical results and conclusions on the conceptual and empirical implications the study 
conveys. 
 
2 Forms and Dynamics of Administrative Cooperation  
This section develops the analytical framework in two steps. First, we offer a typology to 
respond to the question: What does “administrative cooperation”2 stand for? In other 
                                                        
2 Whereas administrative cooperation is a legally codified form of legal assistance between 
competent bodies, we apply the term administrative coordination in a wider sense to grasp also all other 
coordination forms referred to (see esp. table 1). 
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words: how can we systematically classify the possible forms of administrative 
cooperation triggered by the integration of the single market? Second, we sketch out a 
framework that systematically links the functional pressures to which public 
administrations are exposed to the different modes of administrative cooperation. 
Before introducing the typology, it is necessary to briefly outline the status of 
administrative cooperation in the EU integration process. The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) 
introduced new articles on administrative cooperation, which “represents a genuine 
novelty in the European ‘constitutional’ architecture. In the previous setting, 
administrative cooperation was not envisaged among matters conferred to the European 
Union, indeed it seemed even excluded by certain specific Treaty provisions” (Chiti E. 
2012: 54). The new provisions of Article 197 for the first time acknowledge in primary 
law the essential relevance of “cooperation taking place both among the national 
administrations and the European bodies with a view to improving the capacity of 
national administrations to implement EU law effectively” (Chiti E. 2012: 54). This 
official recognition of administrative cooperation should, however, not belie the fact that 
the Union continues to lack hard powers to foster harmonization of the functioning and 
organization of public administrations. Article 197 offers primarily a formal recognition 
of practices that have developed informally or in secondary law before. As such, 
administrative cooperation is to differing degrees and in different forms an integral part 
of particular policies that include specific provisions for their respective administrative 
execution. The method selected here is therefore to identify regularities in the cooperation 
to derive distinct modes of cooperation from the scattered responses applied by 
administrative actors in the EU.  
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To this aim, we build on work by administrative EU law scholars. We refer to this 
literature rather than more recent attempts to theoretically map the EU’s multilevel 
administrative system in its whole (Benz A. et al. 2016; Benz A. 2015; Bauer M. W. & 
J. Trondal 2015) because it offers a more specific conceptual delineation of horizontal 
cooperation, which should add a so far understudied angle. While political scientists have 
developed frameworks to explain political decision-making by conceptualizing policy co-
ordination across territorial levels of government, going by features of family 
resemblance, administrative lawyers distinguish different modes of cooperation in 
implementation practices. Whilst the categorizations referred to vary slightly between 
different authors, we will refer to the most frequently reoccurring ones that can be 
conceptualized as three modes of vertical and horizontal cooperation (also Schmidt-
Aßmann E. 1999: 20, Schmidt-Aßmann E. & Schöndorf-Haubold B. 2005, Sydow G. 
2004):  
• Information cooperation is based on data exchange between competent authorities of 
at least two member states; information collected or held by one national agency is 
made available to another.  
• Procedural cooperation includes administrative practices and acts that span across 
borders. A single administrative procedure or decision involves at least two or more 
administrative agents from different member states (horizontal coordination) and the 
Commission or an EU agency (vertical coordination).  
• Organizational cooperation suggests the establishment of networks or bodies, which 
exist as stable cooperation structures to handle a variety of tasks in contrast to ad hoc 
exchanges or single specific procedures.  
10  
 
These modes – information, procedural and organizational – can occur informally or as 
formalized cooperation. To exemplify the distinction: information cooperation has for a 
long time operated on a mere voluntary informal basis and depended in many instances 
on personal contacts between individual actors inside the public administrations. The 
formal introduction of benchmarking and policy learning instruments rendered 
information exchanges more continuous and systematic (Radaelli C. 2003), while 
especially innovations in the IT-sector have given it a more reliable infrastructure. Yet, 
neither informal nor formal information cooperation entail a substantive conferral of 
administrative authority. Procedural cooperation differs in this respect. Although it does 
not imply the shift of explicit policy competences to the EU-level, it means that national 
authorities also bind themselves to specific joint procedures either on a voluntary or 
compulsory basis. National authorities may do so among each other or in cooperation 
with the Commission. In addition procedural obligations may be formalized by legislation 
that obliges member states to cooperate with their peers in other member states, without 
however creating own EU resources or competences regarding the actual procedure or 
the content of the cooperation. Organizational cooperation adds yet another layer 
because it suggests the creation of informal or formal organizations. Many secondary EU 
acts legally foresee the creation of formal bodies or other permanent structures such as 
standing expert groups. These informal networks and more formal structures may support 
information exchange and the handling or certain joint procedures, they go however 
beyond these mere functions in establishing an organizational infrastructure that exists in 
its own right. Table 1 summarizes the typology based on the three coordination modes. 
 




The three empirical constraints identified in the introduction can now be linked to 
cooperation modes. There is, however, no exclusive relationship between a specific 
constraint and a specific cooperation mode and, empirically, both the different 
administrative challenges and the cooperation responses often overlap, which obstructs 
systematic testing. Still, it is possible to formulate some expectations based on functional 
dynamics recalling the two guiding assumptions that (a) liberalization and re-regulation 
in the single market hollow out administrative capacity, and (b) decision-makers in the 
member states try to avoid a conferral of administrative powers to the supranational level. 
Moving from the upper left quadrant in table 1 (informal information cooperation) to the 
lower right quadrant (formalized institutionalized cooperation), cooperation becomes 
more constraining on national administrative autonomy. Closely related, the latter more 
constraining cooperation is no longer of exclusively horizontal nature but implies 
elements of administrative center formation and can thus be classified as vertical 
cooperation. Accordingly, we expect:  
A strategic choice by an administration for a specific cooperation mode should be 
the least sovereignty constraining option available. 
 
Furthermore, the different challenges suggest different strategic choices to be more or 
less suited. Accordingly, we expect the following likelihoods (see table 2):  
• The re-establishment of national capacities to protect and offer services to citizens 
may be remedied by information exchange that allows for an updating of the 
information pool that can then be used by administrations. All more constraining 
forms may also be opted for in case information exchange proves not sufficient.  
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• The reduction of administrative burdens cannot be solved by additional 
information exchange alone but necessitates the creation of procedural rules that offer 
standardized processes to reduce transaction costs. All more constraining forms may 
be opted for in case information and joint procedures prove not sufficient.  
• Negative externalities caused by dysfunctional single national administrations 
cannot be remedied by information exchange or procedural rules. Negative 
externalities therefore suggest the creation of organizational structures that operate 
through soft mechanism of mutual adaptation and change. If formalized new 
structures may sometimes even comprise the delegation of enforcement powers to 
third parties in order to assure that changes will take place at the level of member 
states creating externalities for the system.  
Table 2 summarizes these expectations. For each field holds that informal solutions are 
less constraining than formalized ones. Accordingly, even informal organizations that 
foster mutual adaptation and change are less constraining than formalized information 
networks, while formalized information networks are less constraining than formalized 
(harmonized) procedures or institutions.  
 
TABLE 2 – ABOUT HERE 
The following section will scrutinize three cases of administrative cooperation in the 
wider field of worker mobility in order to identify how far the expected systematic of 





3 Administrative Cooperation in the Field of Worker 
Mobility 
When the EU was founded, the right to move freely was enshrined in the original Art. 48 
of the Rome Treaty. In principle, any citizen (initially only workers, today also job 
seekers, retires, self-employed) can look for a job in another EU country, work and reside 
there without a specific work permit. Exerting this right involves the administrations of 
at least two member states in a number of policy areas. Thus, worker mobility is a 
significant field in which the three types of administrative challenges can be expected to 
come to bear.  
We pick three policies that cover different aspects of worker mobility and trace changes 
of administrative cooperation over larger time stretches starting with the slowly 
increasing mobility of workers in the 1970s up to the 2010s. First, we look at social 
security systems. In case of worker mobility coverage and contributions have to be 
administered across borders. The second case regards labor inspectorates and other 
delegated bodies controlling labor conditions. The third case, posting of workers, is the 
most encompassing as it created multiple administrative challenges. All three cases 
expose functional pressures emanating from liberalization and re-regulation. At the same 
time politicians in member states are reluctant to confer administrative powers to the 
supranational level as the politicized and lengthy discussion about instruments and ECJ 
case law on the enforcement provisions applicable to the posting of workers 
(2014/67/EU) exemplify (EurActive 2014). 
To analyze form and development of cooperation in these three areas we draw on primary 
documents such as EU legislation and position papers, secondary sources such as reports 
as well as 28 semi-structured expert interviews. They have been carried out between 2000 
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and 2013 at the national (EU 15 member states) and supranational (EU Commission and 
International Labor Organization) level with public officials from ministries and labour 
inspections as well as with trade unions and employer organizations in the area of labor 
mobility and thus present views at different points of the time in the processes studied. 
All interviews have been fully transcribed and coded with Atlas.ti.3 Each case study starts 
by sketching more specifically the administrative challenges emerging in the area before 
it turns to discussing the set-up and evolution of administrative cooperation installed in 
response. 
3.1 Coordination of social security systems (CSSS) 
Social security protects citizens against the risks of health, maternity, accidents at work, 
occupational invalidity, unemployment, (pre-)retirement and death. Typically coverage 
is territorially bound. In case of worker mobility, administrations are thus constrained in 
offering protection to their citizens. However, from its outset, EU integration promoted 
worker mobility based on two guiding principles: equal treatment regardless of 
nationality, and portability of entitlements across countries (Council Regulation No. 
3/1958, Regulation No. 1408/71, revised No. 883/2004). Regulating the exchange of 
coverage information and the flow of financial contributions, the rules also increased 
burdens on national administrations. 
Initially, this exchange was organized through standardized paper forms. An example 
given by an interviewee who described the situation in the 1990s and early 2000s is a 
person that has worked in different member states and wants to retire. She would have to 
                                                        
3 To preserve anonymity we refer to interviews by abbreviation (COM for EU Commission, ILO for 
International Labor Organization, TU for trade unions, A for Austria etc), number and date. A list of 
the interviews directly cited is provided in the Annex. We thank the interviewees for having shared time 
and expertise with us. 
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fill in a form and send it in a paper envelop to the other countries she has worked in. In 
the conventional paper-based exchange, “when there is still open questions, you have to 
reply back, so very old fashioned, like the middle ages really [and …] some member 
states never reply [laughs], and they [administrations, MH] are very frustrated” (COM23, 
10.6.2009, also COM107, 8.10.2009). 
To deal with these problems administrations developed particular response formats. In 
1971 the Administrative Commission was set up to help national administrations to deal 
with the challenge imposed by worker mobility. It is a permanent body where government 
representatives from each member state meet, sometimes complemented by experts and 
supported by a secretariat based in the European Commission. The Administrative 
Commission reviews the annual amounts of reimbursement issued by the home countries, 
serves as a forum to exchange information and acts as last instance to solve complicated 
problems. Examples are conflicts that emerge on how to use the information in the context 
of national social security systems, what definitions and practices to apply. The 
Administrative Commission has a formal legal base but national authorities remain 
autonomous in their administrative decisions. In addition, since 2005 the EU Commission 
finances an expert network on Training and Reporting on European Social Security 
(TrESS).  
Over time more detailed and more binding rules on the format and method of exchanging 
information developed and where formally enshrined in the accompanying Implementing 
Regulations (No. 3/1958, revised No. 574/72 and 987/2009). The Implementing 
Regulation defines a six months deadline for the settlement of claims and interest for late 
payments (Art. 66-67) and specifies rules how to identify the applicable legislation. If no 
decision can be reached, the case will be transferred to the Administrative Commission 
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(Art. 6). Where two or more national social security bodies operate in parallel, a number 
of shared definitions is to guarantee interoperability. This implies some degree of 
harmonization of standards, e.g. how to determine residence (Art. 11), how to aggregate 
periods of insurance, employment, self-employment or residence (Art. 12) as well as on 
the rules for conversion of periods of insurances (Art. 13). The last revision introduces a 
general right and duty of administrations to inform each other “without delay” (Art. 2). 
Finally, the Administrative Commission is allowed to lay down more detailed rules on 
content and structure of documents and transfer (Art. 4), e.g. concerning notification, 
forms and formats or compilation of statistics (Art. 83-87). Most recently, information 
exchange is institutionalized via an Electronic Exchange of Social Security Information 
platform (EESSI), operational since May 2012 with a transitional period until April 2014. 
The platform is operated by the European Commission and receives and sends requests 
that now have to take an electronically predefined form via national access points (ILO 
2010: 36-38).  
Another element newly introduced in 2009 is the right to calculate provisional benefits 
or contributions if information has not been transferred by the corresponding national 
administration (Art. 7). Summarizing these changes that took place in the cooperation of 
national administrations from the 1990s to the 2000s an interviewee reports: 
what is actually the main principle, the philosophy of the implementing regulation, 
is to increase, and to improve substantially, the cooperation between the 
institutions of member states. When the rules are complicated, then at least the 
implementation of it should function in a very smooth way. […] It has been done 
in several ways, the cooperation, like the principle of good administration when 
there is a case of interpretation, of different views between institutions, then they 
should not send the person concerned, or the employer, saying you should go to 
the other, and the other says, no you should go to the one, so ping-pong. No, they 
have the legal obligation to contact each other, to resolve the problem within a 
reasonable period of time. There are now very strict deadlines […] if there is no 
transfer payment fee […] Now there are provisions for provisional application, 
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provisional granting of benefits, and so on. So that has been improved […] by the 
electronic exchange of data (COM23, 10.6.2009). 
 
Overall, in the area of coordination of social security systems, administrative cooperation 
has evolved in response to transnational rules of free movement that challenged the 
capacity to protect citizens. Secondary legislation seeking to support worker mobility at 
the same time further increased burden on administrations. Responses taken by national 
executives from the outset focused on information exchange, which became more 
formalized over time and is today supported by modern IT tools. Yet, information sharing 
on social security remains contested and vertical coordination out of reach because 
national actors fear the loss of control over the rights attribution, which has substantive 
budgetary implications. The area remains therefore subject of cumbersome bilateral 
coordination. In parallel, organizational cooperation can be identified as instance of joint 
procedures via forms and definitions to reduce daily burdens in a development which was 
led by the Administrative Commission.  
 
3.2 Labor inspectorates (LI) 
In all member states labor inspectors visit firms, enterprises and companies to control 
working conditions, minimum wages and social security coverage.4 The liberalization 
and re-regulation of the Common Market poses complex challenges for these 
administrative actors since their competences are territorially bound. Facing mobile 
workers, they are constrained in enforcing that workers’ safety as well as the quality of 
services is provided, particularly in regions with high mobility, such as border regions. 
                                                        
4 In some countries labor inspection is limited to health and safety aspects, though. Depending on the 




Where Portuguese inspectors cannot check for coverage of social security contributions 
or maximum working hours of their construction employees because these are employed 
in Berlin, basic administrative functions are challenged (TU1, 2.2.2004, EPSU 2012: 26). 
Actors strongly feel “a need to – even if it is on an informal basis – exchange that type of 
information and establish mechanisms to have this information on cross-border issues” 
(COM15, 22.2.2006). 
What is more, uneven monitoring and enforcement of standards across Europe may create 
unfair competition. This was clearly feared by (some) national administrations when 
developing cooperation across countries. The following quote nicely explains how 
inefficiencies in one country were perceived as a source of social dumping in the EU: 
For the last years we have spent a lot of resources on trying to some extent to... 
not to harmonize the way the EU enforces the legislation in Europe, but we have 
tried to develop a kind of a close cooperation between the different relevant 
enforcement authorities in Europe, so we have some ideas how they have 
organized the work and also the different methods they are using. And that is very 
important for us, that you have the feeling that the other member states are more 
or less doing... maybe not the same, but make in some way the same efficient 
enforcement of the legislation to avoid what we call social dumping or unfair 
competition or whatever you like. But that’s the idea that you have the common 
play rules, or common regulations on health and safety at work, but you also need 
to have a more or less the same way of enforcing the legislation (DK5, 
28.11.2000). 
 
Interestingly, first responses to coordination pressures emerged as informal cooperation 
between national labor inspectorates in a bottom-up fashion. Since 1982, high-ranking 
national officials met in a voluntary network, the Senior Labor Inspectors Committee 
(SLIC). In the 1990s the SLIC was transformed into an advisory committee for the 
Commission (95/319/EG). Top officials from national labor inspectorates meet twice a 
year under the auspice of the respective presidency. Organizational sub-groups look at 
different problems and seek cooperation activities to cope with them, e.g. monitoring the 
movement of dangerous machinery (MACHEX) via e-tools. Common principles of 
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inspections were adopted in 1997 (revised in 2004) and constitute an agreed benchmark 
to evaluate national enforcement systems through audits.5 Activities are complemented 
by inspector exchange programs, financed by the Commission (COM15, 22.2.2006) that 
support the creation of national capacity to interact in administrative networks, not least 
by increasing mutual trust and understanding (Hartlapp M. 2014). 
In all its activities the SLIC works via horizontal cooperation. But there are also attempts 
to centralize cooperation at the European level. Importantly, recently the Commission has 
offered financial support for a network of inspectorates to build an European Level 
Enforcement System (CIBELES).6 These activities are still informal, yet they are highly 
interesting because they triggered a debate about organizational cooperation at the center 
(Dekker H. et al. 2010, Velázquez Fernández M. 2011). In addition, CIBELES has 
produced strategically important information that the Commission can now use, to push 
for vertical cooperation by showing potential benefits of the provision of information at 
the supranational level. More specifically this concerns numbers of work related 
accidents, professional diseases or identification of posted workers as well as solutions 
on cross-border enforcement of administrative fines and penalties (Velázquez Fernández 
M. 2011). 
In addition, in regions or between countries with particular strong cross-border 
movements, joint inspections have been carried out since the early 1990s (COM15, 
22.2.2006, Velázquez Fernández M. 2011). Such bilateral or multilateral cooperation 
between labor inspectorates remains largely informal and ad hoc. A good example is the                                                         
5 These audits were also systematically used to ex-ante screen enforcement systems in all 10 accession 
countries, with auditing teams from the old member states visiting the CEEC (ILO13, 27.9.2004, TU2, 
2.2.2004, COM15, 22.2.2006). 
6 CIBELES is financed under PROGRESS. Together with the European Network on Undeclared Work 




Baltic Sea Network on Occupational Health and Safety (Lithuanian, Estonian and 
Latvian). Portugal and Spain (Dekker H. et al. 2010: 25-28) as well as Germany and 
Luxembourg carry out joint inspections “particularly on building sites and in areas with 
a high concentration of posted workers” (ILO 2011: 91). However, formalization in form 
of binding regulation has been explicitly objected to by the political level. The recently 
adopted enforcement directive of the Posting of Workers (2014/67/EU) explicitly 
abstains from procedural cooperation as a formal cross-territorial inspection duty (Art. 
7). Instead, cross-border enforcement is to work through mutual assistance and 
recognition of fines and penalties (Art. 13). 
In sum, the area of labor inspectorates is strongly characterized by a loss of administrative 
capacity to protect individual national citizens and administrative constraints emerging 
from other labor inspection systems’ inefficiencies (Hartlapp, 2014). In addition, in some 
respect, administrations face additional burdens, e.g. when it comes to cross-border 
inspections and the execution of fines across border. Organizational cooperation emerged 
bottom-up in the SLIC and was pushed by national actors seeking a level playing field, a 
dynamic the EU Commission willingly supported and formalized against autonomy 
preserving interests. Specific about this case is that organizational cooperation served as 
hub to develop (electronic) means to exchange information (e.g. MACHEX) and joint 
procedures for capacity assessments (e.g. inspection guidelines). Most recently, following 
incentives by the European Commission, organizational cooperation is taken to the 
supranational level by building an European Level Enforcement System (CIBELES). Yet, 
it is still too early to judge whether this will see the light against member states reluctant 




3.3 Posted workers (PW) 
Workers that have a contract with an employer in their home country and are sent abroad 
to carry out a work project for up to 24 months are called posted workers.7 Directive 
96/71/EC seeks to clarify which rules apply in this situation of transnational work 
execution. To avoid unfair competition and secure worker rights, posted workers have to 
be employed under the minimum working conditions that are applicable in the host 
country, such as work and rest periods, wages and paid leave, equal treatment and health 
and safety conditions. Social security contributions are paid in the host country. For 
companies the partial split between home and host country creates the possibility to boost 
margins through reduced labor costs. For administrations, however, this split translates 
into constraints. Where the Posted Workers Directive is thoroughly applied, member 
states have to set up one or more liaison bodies and designate a competent authority (Art. 
4). Responsibilities for cooperation remain exclusively under the authority of national 
administrations. And although the directive formulates binding provisions, rules on the 
exchange of information remain vague. In practice employers demand a standardized 
paper form from the home country social security authority for the workers they want to 
post (PDA1, previously E101, cf. CSSS above). The form contains information on 
contributions and coverage of social security at home. Administrations in the host country 
have to rely on this information to adequately protect the workers and to monitor and 
enforce their rights. Yet, often procedures are delayed and workers are posted with no or 
an incomplete form (cf. Cremers J. 2013: 207). Thus, if secondary legislation is not 
                                                        
7 Frontier workers, by distinction, live in one country and have an employment contract and workplace 
in another country, commuting on a daily or weekly basis. Migrant workers have left their country to 
live and seek employment in a host country. Often posting is closely connected to debates about 
temporary agency work or undeclared work. 
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applied correctly, externalities will grow with increasing number of posted workers from 
low wage and social security contribution countries, as happened after the eastern 
enlargement and the liberalization of services directive. 
In response, the Commission published a recommendation on enhanced administrative 
cooperation (2008/C 85/01) and the so-called Enforcement Directive of the provisions 
applicable to the posting of workers (2014/67/EU). The directive foresees the quick 
supply of information via electronic forms, meaning that requested information has to be 
provided within two weeks (Art. 6). Aiming at the improved application of existing rules 
the act at the same time specifies new tasks for administrations. 
It is too early to assess the responses to this latest directive since transposition is due in 
2016 only. Yet, administrative responses developed already prior to the act. The Internal 
Market Information System (IMI), applicable for administrative cooperation in this field 
since 2012 (Regulation 1024/2012), is an electronic tool. Financed as an EU pilot project 
since 20068 it organizes workflows processing information requests. To enforce EU rules 
on the posting of workers such information exchange via the IMI allows e.g. to check the 
employment conditions for workers posted in a country and it offers repositories to share 
data among administrations (Directive 2014/67/EU). A French administration seeking to 
check the Social Security Status of a Finish planning engineer can find the responsible 
Finish administration via the IMI, select a pre-formulated question from the website and 
send this via IMI to the Finish authority. The Finish authority is displayed the question 
and possible answers in Finish. Once the answer is selected, it will be displayed in French 
to the French authority. The number of exchanges on posted workers has substantially 
                                                        
8 The IMI has been funded mainly by the Programs Interoperable Delivery of European 
eGovernment Services to public Administrations, Businesses and Citizens (IDABC) and Interoperability 
Solutions for European Public Administrations (ISA). 
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increased. While for 2011 “a total of 181 information exchanges had taken place” 
(European Commission 2012: 18), the figures for first half of the year 2015 alone indicate 
783 exchanges.9 A different form of response is the creation of a High Level Group, the 
Committee of Experts on Posting of Workers (2009/17/EC). It puts competent public 
authorities and social partners around a table to exchange of information and foster 
learning processes (Dekker H. et al. 2010: 23). 
Overall the main administrative challenges identified in this area are the increased need 
for information to uphold protection of citizens sent abroad. Secondary legislation on 
posted workers and the enforcement of these rules has produced specific administrative 
burdens. To the degree that these rules are not applied, negative externalities for 
administrations increase. The response developed so far can be classified as information 
cooperation via IMI, but also increasingly joint procedures to reduce transaction costs. 
Over time and despite political contestation on the topic running prominently between 
Eastern European countries and ‘old’ member states, the IMI has become formalized and 
is developing an organizational dimension via a central administration and repositories at 
the EU level. Organizational cooperation is also institutionalized with a High Level 
Group on Posted Workers. 
 
4 Patterns of Administrative Cooperation  
Comparing the results of the three case studies, they support by and large our expectations 
about the strategic selection of coordination modes under the postulate that a sovereignty 
                                                        
9 See data provided by the Commission on the website on the Single Market, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/performance_by_governance_tool/internal_market_infor
mation_system/index_en.htm#maincontentSec3 (last accessed 21 August 2015). 
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transfer of administrative competences to the EU level is generally ruled out. To recall: 
the cases and the research interest focus on policies in which vertical coordination is pre-
empted by political choice. This allows to observe in which guises politically less 
constraining horizontal administrative coordination occurs as alternative. As discussed in 
the first parts of the article, the three empirically observed challenges may overlap and 
occur in parallel. This is well reflected in the three cases: while in the coordination of 
social security systems the loss of the capacity to offer services to citizens and the growth 
of administrative burdens dominates, in the case of labor inspections the dominant 
problem combination is that of capacity loss and the threat of negative externalities. In 
the case of posted workers, all three pressures prove relevant.  
In order to gain more theoretical leverage, it is worthwhile to reflect on the coordination 
dynamics from the angle of the responses. Table 3 summarizes the (minimal) strategic 
choice expected and the actual response observed in each of the three cases. The first 
observation is that indeed all the minimal responses occurred. Accordingly, information 
exchange as least constraining coordination mode is used in all three cases to respond to 
pressures trigged by a capacity loss to offer services to national citizens. Remarkably, in 
all cases the way information is exchanged has been at least partially formalized over 
time. Also in all cases, the development of electronic communication platforms has 
played a role to improve information exchange efficiency. The use of electronic tools 
hints to the strong pressure to improve information exchange in the CSSS and PW cases 
in particular. Also procedural rules play a role in all case, yet to different degrees and at 
different points in the development of responses, which will be elaborated on below. 
What is more, in some cases secondary legislation also defines limits to procedural 
cooperation to preempt a formalization that implies sovereignty transfers. Thus, in a 
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recent enforcement directive Member States explicitly formulated that cross-border 
enforcement should work through mutual assistance and recognition of fines and 
penalties. Most notably, informal or more formalized forms of organizational 
cooperation set in at different stages and to different degrees but are also observable in 
all cases. In essence, we see over time a tendency towards formalized forms of 
coordination, often supported by strategic supranational agency, that constrain 
administrative sovereignty more than informal ones. In line with our expectations the less 
constraining forms of coordination dominate especially the CSSS case in which 
externalities played a lesser role.  
 
TABLE 3 – ABOUT HERE 
 
To delve deeper into the differences between the cases, it is worthwhile considering the 
sequence of responses given to the particular mix of administrative challenges. Across all 
cases, once organizational structures have been set up (mostly informal in a first step) 
these are then referred to in order to develop further procedural rules and to improve 
information exchange mechanisms. In other words, there appears to be a feedback on less 
constraining coordination modes even if the organized bodies are informal and have thus 
no legal authority over the other coordination practices. The LI case is most remarkable 
in this respect. Due to uneven monitoring and enforcement standards of LI across the 
states, externalities appear inevitable. Given that formal organizations are ruled out for a 
lack of member state agreement, organizational coordination is established informally 
and bottom-up as of the 1980s. Once in place, this organizational coordination via the 
SLIC is structuring administrative coordination, which may also explain why in this case 
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less procedural rules have been developed and why these remain informal unlike the other 
two cases. Unlike the other two cases, the sequencing in the LI case starts with 
organizational cooperation, which then structures the procedural and information 
cooperation. It has the additional effect that both information exchange on best practices 
of inspection and procedural rules in form of joint inspections are less developed whilst 
the SLIC as an institutional cooperation structure was formalized in 1995. In contrast, in 
the CSSS case we see an incremental strengthening of responses in terms of formalization 
of deadlines and implementing rules via respective regulations since the 1970s as well as 
the step-by-step establishment of more constraining responses that, eventually, allow for 
provisional decisions in case an authority does not comply with its information duties The 
PW case, finally, is the only case in which all three pressures – capacity loss, 
administrative burdens, externality threat – were obvious from the start in the 1990s. It is 
the case with the most formalized responses for all types. Notably, in this case information 
exchange via electronic tools and procedural rules in standardized form sheets precede 
the establishment of the High Level Group, which may explain the strong formalization 
of the earlier responses.  
We may hence tentatively conclude that the kind of pressure public administrations are 
faced with does indeed impact on the response chosen and the dynamic instruments 
developed. In essence, information exchange, as least constraining form of coordination, 
appears in different guises: triggered independently among competent authorities, guided 
by organized joint bodies, and incrementally formalized by participating authorities, 
organized bodies or more top-down by the Commission. Procedural rules occur either as 
planned input from organizational coordination or to optimize information exchange. 
Organizational coordination, finally, can follow as logical “last step” in strengthening 
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coordination or be put in place as first step if externalities are the clearly dominant 
challenge public administrations are faced with.   
Our framework did not hypothezise explicitly on the origin of the cooperation. Yet, in 
light of the clear red lines the Treaties draw against top-down harmonization, and 
respective limitations of supranational agency, the bottom-up initiatives are an interesting 
dynamic. Aware of their capacity deficits and related implementation problems, national 
administrations initiate intergovernmental networks and structures, which stresses the 
force of functional pressures. Member states opt for administrative cooperation even in 
an area of core national sovereignty to cope with their own capacity deficits and to avoid 
policy failure. Lacking regulatory policy developments that could piggyback 
formalization of rules, administrative cooperation in the area of labor inspectorates 
remains mostly informal. In contrast, administrative cooperation interwoven with policies 
on the coordination of social security systems and on posted workers is today more 
formalized. The conclusions will offer some tentative interpretation of these results. 
 
5 Conclusion 
The study set out to offer conceptual and empirical insights as to how member state public 
administrations respond to pressures they are inevitably confronted with in the single 
market. Three such challenges were empirically identified: a loss of capacity to offer 
services to the citizens whose rights to services are no longer bound to a single state’s 
territory, increasing administrative burdens and possible externalities from administrative 
failure due to dysfunctionalities of other member states’ public administrations. We 
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selected the significant field of worker mobility as policy area to examine how these 
challenges play out empirically in three case studies. 
Conceptually, this article developed a framework for bureaucratic actors’ strategic 
instrument choice in response to new pressures on public administrations. Building on a 
typology that defines different modes of administrative cooperation, expectations about 
most likely responses were formulated. The conceptual value added lies thus in offering 
a specific additional angle that complements recent literature on multilevel 
administration, which conceptualizes primarily interaction effects between the 
supranational and national levels of governance. The focus of our analysis serves to 
systematically scrutinize how coordination lacking strategic power by supranational 
actors may nonetheless evolve when functional pressure is high. The theoretical 
expectations are well reflected in the three case studies. The framework thus shows 
fruitful to analyze patterns of administrative cooperation. In addition, the theoretical take 
allows distinguishing more precisely different types of actor responses to unintended and 
non-regulated effects and thereby complements conceptualizations of EU multilevel 
administration (Benz A. et al. 2016, Bauer M. W. & Trondal 2015). Even if the three case 
studies do not offer a systematic testing of the framework, they show the plausibility and 
applicability of the framework which hence promises to be of further theoretical use in 
future research on how to mend the holes of multilevel policymaking.  
The case studies show that horizontal administrative cooperation is step-wise developed 
and takes, over time, more institutionalized shape. Thus, the first relevant finding is that 
considering a general reluctance of member states to confer powers regarding their 
genuine administrative authority, horizontal cooperation is used and expanded to respond 
to functional pressures. Second, the case studies indicate that different kinds of functional 
29  
 
pressure influence the instrument choice. Most notably, if administrative failure in other 
member states threatens to harm the own administrative capacity, more constraining 
administrative cooperation is applied. Third, a remarkable result is that if no formal action 
is taken by national governments, we observe bottom-up informal cooperation by 
administrative actors – even in the rather constraining form of organizational cooperation. 
What is more, where the issue of worker mobility was politicized - essentially for the 
threatening administrative failures that were expected - we do indeed see an acceleration 
of the creation of administrative cooperation. This indicates, that where stakes are high 
integration proceeds even informally (cf. also Héritier A. 1997, Heidbreder E. G. 2014a). 
However, in the case of Labor Inspectorates, we also see recent regulation that abstains 
from formalizing procedural cooperation to push for less regulated mutual recognition. 
This essentially limits the process of administrative capacity building through horizontal 
cooperation, which plays in the hands of political preferences for a liberalizing rather than 
a re-regulating agenda. 
In sum, we can sustain that horizontal administrative cooperation is a relevant additional 
integration dynamic that buffers unintended effects of market integration on formally 
independent but increasingly interdependent member state executive bodies. Based on 
these results, we may expect that horizontal administrative cooperation will gain further 
relevance in the completion of the single market as a pragmatic alternative to more 
encompassing harmonization or vertical cooperation where non-politicized matters are at 
stake. Also, technocratic, subterfuge coordination of this kind should remain a politically 
preferable path for many. This implies also room for future research on horizontal 
cooperation as means to increase administrative independence vis-à-vis national political 
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actors. For politicized matters, in contrast, the route administrative coordination and 





Table 1: Administrative Cooperation Modes 
 
Mode Definition  
 
Informal  Formal  
Information  
cooperation  
Information necessary to 
implement EU law is 
being exchanged across 
borders  
Voluntary provision of 





Obligation to provide / 
share information either 
in cross-country 
exchange (data stays 






Joint procedures for a 
single administrative act 
exist that involve entities 
from more than one 




procedures that involve 
horizontally more than 
one member states’ 
authorities  
 
Legal obligations to 
jointly execute a single 
administrative act that 
includes various 
horizontally or vertically 





molded in a specific, 
institutional structure  
 
Administrative, advisory, 
civil society or other 
(self-organized) 
networks or groups with 
no legally formalized 
role in policy 
implementation  
(Semi)autonomous 
agencies, committees or 
groups with a legally 
formalized role in 
decision-making and 






























 Creation of informal 
joint procedures to 








failure in other 
member state 
  organizations that foster 
mutual adaptation and 
change 





Table 3: Expected and observed coordination responses 
 
 Mix of administrative 
challenges 
Expected response Observed response 
(chronological) 
CSSS Capacity loss + 
administrative burden 
Information exchange + 
procedural rules  
 
Step-wise formalized 
information exchange +  
informal organizational 
coordination +  
procedural rules 
 
LI Capacity loss +  
externality threat  
(administrative burden 
limited to specific areas) 





organization coordination +  
step-wise formalized 
information exchange + 
procedural rules   
 
PW Capacity loss +  
administrative burden +  
externality threat 
Information exchange + 




information exchange + 
procedural rules + 
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